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  11. Introduction  
The EU’s agri-environmental programmes were introduced as “Accompanying Measures” of 
the 1992 Mac Sharry Reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In Regulation 
EC 2078/92, the main objectives of agri-environmental programmes were defined as: i) 
reducing or stabilizing production levels, ii) safeguarding farm income, and iii) improving 
environmental quality. Most programmes aim to achieve these objectives by putting 
restrictions on environmentally harmful inputs (e.g. fertilizer), and thereby leading to less 
intensive agricultural production systems. Farmers are compensated for rising production 
costs by area-based direct compensation payments. Participation in these programmes is 
voluntary and the expenditures are co-financed. For objective 1 areas the EU takes over 75%, 
for all other areas 50%. 
The number of agri-environmental programmes launched under EU Regulation 2078/92 and 
EU Regulation 1257/99 as well as the amount of agricultural land covered under these 
programmes varies significantly between EU member states. While more than two thirds of 
the total agricultural area was covered by at least one agri-environmental programme in 
Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, the share was less than 5 % in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Netherlands and Spain (Figure 1). Payments per hectare varied between € 45 and € 328 in 
1997 and between € 41 and € 348 in 1998. The objective of this paper is to analyse the spatial 
heterogeneity in the uptake of agri-environmental programmes across Europe, based on a 
conceptual framework which integrates environmental and political considerations into a 
standard economic welfare function. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops a model which explains the 
influence of several economic, environmental and political factors on the implementation of 
agri-environmental policies. In section 4, we analyse the nationally optimal uptake of agri-
environmental  programmes, depending on whether a member country acts non-cooperatively 
  2to maximise national welfare or whether cooperative governmental behaviour among EU 
member countries is assumed. Section 5 then validates the model, based on the empirical 
evidence of the EU’s agri-environmental scheme. The paper ends by discussing the main 
findings. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
A common feature of most agri-environmental programmes in the EU is to offer farmers 
compensation payments for the implementation of environmentally favourable production 
technologies. Since participation in agri-environmental programmes is not compulsory, 
farmers only participate, if compensation payments exceed the costs involved with changing 
production methods. Private costs arise because participation in agri-environmental 
programmes, which often restrict the use of agro-chemical inputs, is linked to higher private 
production costs and/or lower physical yields and thereby reduces profits. The profit 
reductions linked to the participation in agri-environmental schemes will be referred to as 
“private costs”. We assume that marginal private costs (MPC) increase as more land is 
covered under agri-environmental schemes. The rationale is that farmers may first reduce the 
intensity of unproductive land before highly productive land is included in agri-environmental 
schemes.  
Figure 1 depicts the marginal private costs (MPC) associated with the change towards 
environmentally more friendly production methods, as well as the marginal social benefits of 
the environmental quality improvement (MSB). The marginal social benefits (MSB) 
associated with the implementation of agri-environmental programmes will be generally 
positive, whereas the slope of the MSB might be negative or positive. Assume that countries 
have to finance the agri-environmental compensations payments by themselves. The socially 
  3optimal payment rate   and the optimal area covered by agri-environmental programmes 
(
*) in country i is then determined by the intersection of the MPC and MSB curves, given 
that administrative and transactions costs are neglected. If taxes are mainly paid by non-
farmers, which are also regarded to be the beneficiaries of environmental quality 
improvements, their welfare improvement is represented by area III, while farmers would 




Let us now extend the model of Figure 1 to account for equity considerations and the costs of 
raising public funds. An important objective of the CAP, as specified with EC 2078/92 
regulation, is to support farmers’ income, which is also reflected in the current design of the 
EU’s agricultural policy. Hence, we specify a country’s political objective function so that it 
makes a provision for a different weight being attributed to farmers’ welfare: 
) ( ) ( , , i F i i i N i i A U A U W δ + =                                  ( 1 )  
Let the welfare of farmers and non-farmers be denoted by U  and U , respectively, while   
represents the political weight attributed to farmers’ welfare. The welfare function thus 
captures equity considerations which have featured in many recent contributions to the 
literature on agricultural policy analysis, as has been discussed by Bullock and Salhofer 
(2003). If a government considers farmers as a social group which needs to be supported,   
will be greater than unity. Hence, within a normative analytical approach,   may represent 
the objective to insure social justice, which would then need to be balanced against economic 
and environmental goals. In positive economics,   would indicate the political weight given 
to farm income, which might be due to the lobbying pressure of interests groups (Becker, 
1983). 




  4Farmers’ financial gain from participating in agri-environmental programmes is determined 
by the difference between compensation payments (DiAi) and private costs (PC). Consider a 
quadratic costs function leading to a linear MPC curve: 
i i i A b k MPC + =      ( ≥ k ;  b )                           (2)     0 i 0 ≥ i
Assuming profit maximising behaviour (Di=MPC), farmers’ welfare function can then be 
written as:  
2
2
, i i F i A b U =                                ( 3 )  
We also consider a linear marginal social benefit function:   
i i i A c l MSB + =         ( l > ;  i i k i i b c < )                           (4) 
By making use of equation (4), the net welfare gain for non-farmers resulting from agri-
environmental policies is obtained by deducting the costs of public funds (Ui,BD) which are 
associated with the implementation of agri-environmental programmes from the social benefit 
(SB), which results from environmental quality improvement: 
BD i
i
i i i N i U
A
c A l U ,
2
, 2
− + =                                  ( 5 )  
The costs of raising public funds for agri-environmental programmes (U ) in any of the N 













j i i i i i i i BD i A D s t A D t s s U
1
, 1 1 λ                       ( 6 )  
where  1 ;  1 ;  0 ≥ ≥ i s 0 ≥ ≥ i t 1 ≥ i λ ; i N ,... 2 , 1 =  and  i j ≠ . 
Let   denote the share of the programme cost that have to be financed nationally (e.g. 0.5 for 
50%) by country i, while t
i s
i is the share the country contributes to the overall EU budget. The 
  5total national contribution to the agri-environmental payments is multiplied by the factor  i λ , 
which accounts for a country’s administrative and/or political costs associated with the raising 
of public funds (Hagemann et al. 1988). 
 
3. Non-cooperative governmental behaviour  
The starting point of the analysis is to determine the socially optimal uptake of agri-
environmental programmes if EU member countries maximise national (rather than EU) 
welfare and thereby act non-cooperatively. Later, in section 4, we will investigate the optimal 
agri-environmental policy based on cooperative governmental behaviour.  
Given profit maximising behaviour (Di=MPC), the optimisation problem for a non-
cooperatively acting EU member country can be formulated by making use of equations (1), 
(3), (5) and (6):  








max j j j j
N
j
j i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i




+ − − + − + − + + = ∑
−
=
λ λ δ         (7) 
Solving equation (7) yields:  
() ()
( ( ) ) i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i s t s b b c
s t s k l
A
− + − +





λ                            ( 8 )  
It is interesting to note, that the Cournot solution of equation (8) does not result from a 
strategic interaction between EU member countries. This is because country i’s optimal 
uptake of agri-environmental policy ( ) is not dependent on the extent to which agri-
environmental policies are implemented in other countries ( ). Note further, that it is not 
clear whether   maximises or minimises national welfare. This can be derived from the 
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i t s t s b c
A
W
− + − + =
∂
∂
λ δ 2 2
2
) )                                ( 9 )  
Since the sign of equation (9) is ambiguous, we conclude that the second-order condition for 
an interior maximum ( 0
2 2 < ∂ i i A W ∂ ) is not necessarily fulfilled. If equation takes a positive 
value, national welfare will continuously be enhanced if the agri-environmental area is 
increased beyond  . This scenario may occur, if farmers political weight is strong and 
programme participation leads to large environmental improvements (large c  and 
*
i A
i i δ ), while 
the national contribution to programme expenditures and the costs of raising public funds are 





2 2 < ∂ ∂ i i A W , ), the impact of different parameters on the optimal uptake of agri-
environmental programmes can be calculated by taking the first derivatives of equation (8):
0
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   (17) 
Comparative static analysis suggests that   is positively related to programme benefits 
(increases with increasing l and c) and the political weight given to farmers (δ). On the other 




i A is negatively related to the programme participation costs (k and b), the 
economic and/or political cost of budget expenditures (λ), the share of programme 
expenditures covered by national budgets (s) and the extent to which a country has to finance 
the overall EU budget (t). 
 
4. Cooperative governmental behaviour  
Next, we analyse the optimal uptake of agri-environmental policy in country i, if it 
coordinates its domestic policy with other EU member countries to maximise EU welfare. To 
simplify the analysis, we consider a bilateral model (i = 0,1). The optimisations problem can 
then be written as: 
() ( ) () () ()
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     (18) 
where  ;  ;  0 , ≥ j i p p s s s j i = = 1 1 0 = +t t ;  2 , 1 , = j i  and  i j ≠ . 
Hence, the cooperative solution becomes: 
() () ( )( )
() () ( () ) ( ) i i j j i i i i i i i i
i i j j i i i i i i
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         ( 1 9 )  
Analogously to the previous section, we calculate the partial derivatives of equation (19) in 
order to analyse how the different parameters influence the optimal agri-environmental area:
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    (28) 
Equations (20)-(26) show that, similar to the cooperative solution of the previous section, the 
optimal area   is large if environmental benefits from agri-environmental programmes are 
highly valued by the society (large l and c) and a high political weight is given to the country 
(p) and its farmers (δ). On the other hand, high programme participation costs (k and b) as 
well as high cost of public expenses (λ) lead to a small size of  . Note, that the direction of 





  9budgets (s) and the extent to which a country has to finance the overall EU budget (t) 
crucially depends on the political weight given to the country (p) and the administrative costs 
of raising public expenses (λ). Equation (27) and (28) demonstrate that s and t are positively 
related to  , if 
*
i A i i j j p p λ λ >
cb δ+β




i i j j p p λ λ <
% =α Ac
 
5. Empirical Test 
For testing the theoretical results of the previous sections, we simplify the model by 
explaining the farm area covered by agri-environmental programmes, expressed as a 
percentage of the total area (A
%), by the variables c, b, λ, δ, and t.
3 A limitation of the 
empirical analysis is that the number of observations is constrained to 15 member states. 
Hence, it is only possible to use a simple linear specification:
4  
t b δλ +β +β +β λ+β +ε             ( 2 9 )   t
Data about the area covered under agri-environmental programmes for each country are only 
available for the period between 1993 and 1998. However, the data for the years 1993 -1996 
are incomplete and not available for all countries. Hence, the analysis is based on data of 1997 
and 1998. The costs associated with the participation in agri-environmental programmes (b) 
are approximated by yields per hectare, assuming that opportunity costs for keeping 
environmental obligations are positively correlated to the productivity of agricultural land. 
Budgetary pressure (λ) is approximated by budget deficits as a percentage of countries’ total 
national budget. We assume the political weight for farmers (δ) to be indicated by the overall 
national expenditures for agricultural support as a percentage of the agricultural net added 
value in factor cost. Finding an appropriate approximation for benefits of agri-environmental 
programmes is difficult. Given the lack of data for more suitable indicators, we assume 
  10environmental benefits to be linked to the tourism industry, which is represented by the 
number of beds offered to tourists per 100 inhabitants. Countries’ contribution to the overall 
EU budget can be calculated based on each nations’ GDP in relation to the aggregate GDP of 
the EU.  Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis. All parameters are significant 
and besides of t, all parameters show the right sign. 
 
6. Discussion 
The extent to which co-financed agri-environmental programmes are implemented varies 
considerably between EU member states. Based on a theoretical model, we analysed the 
influence of economic, environmental and political factors on the uptake of agri-
environmental programmes. The area under agri-environmental programmes increases as 
more political weight is given to farmers’ income. Under the current design of most agri-
environmental programmes, farmers are compensated for using environmentally friendly 
production practices. Since participation in agri-environmental schemes is voluntary and a 
fixed area based direct payment is offered, farmers participating in agri-environmental 
programmes will be generally better off. Moreover, offering compensation payments for 
environmental quality improvements means that property right for the use of natural resources 
like water or soil are de facto conferred to farmers.  
We further showed that the area covered under agri-environmental programmes is larger the 
higher the social benefits associated with environmental quality improvements. Social 
benefits from environmental quality improvements are likely to be higher in countries with a 
big tourism industry, as well as in countries where water and/or soil resources are scarce. We 
also showed that farmers’ demand for agri-environmental schemes is expected to decline as 
the production costs involved with the participation in agri-environmental programmes 
  11increase. Hence, regions where the productivity of agricultural land is rather low are likely to 
implement agri-environmental programmes to a comparatively large extent.  
Given the co-financing rule for the EU’s agri-environmental programmes, adoption rates for 
agri-environmental policies are likely to be lower in countries with budgetary problems and in 
nations which contribute a relatively large share to the overall EU budget, if nations act non-
cooperatively. Nevertheless, the supposition that high net contributions to the EU budget 
would reduce the attraction for agri-environmental policies cannot be supported by the 
empirical analysis. This might be due to the limitations of data, notably the small number of 
observations. However, it might be also that EU member countries act cooperatively to 
maximise EU (rather than national) welfare.  
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  12Endnotes 
1  Considering that c  may take a positive value,  i ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 < − + − i i i i i s t s λ δ  becomes a necessary 
condition which ensures that the second-order condition for a maximum at 
* holds 
(negative value of equation 9). 
i A
2 We still assume that equation (9) takes a negative value and thereby that  () () 0 1 2 < − + − i i i i i s t s λ δ .
 
3 Since the share of programme expenditures financed by the EU is 0.75 for objective 1 areas 
(instead of 0.5 for all other areas), the average share financed nationally (s) is not exactly 
the same for all countries. However, due to lack of information on this, we do not include s 
in the empirical model. 
4 A second order approximation in form of a quadratic polynomial might have been a more 
appropriate model, but could not be conducted. A quadratic polynomial specification would 
have to estimate 26 parameters for five independent variables. 
 
  13Table 1. Percentage of agricultural area under agri-environmental programs and payments per 
hectare in 1997 and 1998. 
 1997    1998   
Country  % of program area  payments/ha  % of program area  payments/ha 
Austria 73.0  144  67.8  140 
Belgium 1.3  80  1.7  348 
Denmark 3.4  142  3.9  142 
Finland 91.3  125  86.9  125 
France 20.3  45  22.9  45 
Germany 37.0  59  38.9  83 
Greece 0.3  328  0.6  328 
Ireland 18.5  135  24.1  129 
Italy 6.7  266  13.6  266 
Luxembourg 76.4  88  76.1  82 
Netherlands 1.6  278  1.9  268 
Portugal 15.4  109  16.8  105 
Spain 2.1  78  2.9  82 
Sweden 51.0  81  51.6  68 
UK 8.0  49  14.6  41 
EU 15  16.5  91  19.5  99 
 













Area under agri-environmental 
programmes ( )  i A
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Table 2. OLS Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α  16.91  9.17 1.84 0.08 
t  1.04 0.34 3.11 0.00 
b -0.33  0.12  -2.76  0.01 
λ  -5.88 1.32  -4.46 0.00 
c  1.23 0.67 1.83 0.08 
δ  1.03 0.09 11.54  0.00 
Adj.R2  0.90     
 
 